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Abstract
Distributed stochastic gradient descent is an important subroutine in distributed
learning. A setting of particular interest is when the clients are mobile devices, where
two important concerns are communication efficiency and the privacy of the clients.
Several recent works have focused on reducing the communication cost or introducing
privacy guarantees, but none of the proposed communication efficient methods are known
to be privacy preserving and none of the known privacy mechanisms are known to be
communication efficient. To this end, we study algorithms that achieve both communication
efficiency and differential privacy. For d variables and n ≈ d clients, the proposed method
uses O(log log(nd)) bits of communication per client per coordinate and ensures constant
privacy.
We also extend and improve previous analysis of the Binomial mechanism showing
that it achieves nearly the same utility as the Gaussian mechanism, while requiring fewer
representation bits, which can be of independent interest.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Distributed stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is a basic building block of modern machine
learning [26, 11, 9, 29, 1, 28, 5]. In the typical scenario of synchronous distributed learning, in
every round, each client obtains a copy of a global model which it updates based on its local
data. The updates (usually in the form of gradients) are sent to a parameter server, where
they are averaged and used to update the global model. Alternatively, without a central server,
∗Most of the research was performed while the author was on an internship at Google Research, New York
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each client saves a global model, broadcasts the gradient to all other clients, and updates its
model with the aggregated gradient.
Often, the communication cost of sending the gradient becomes the bottleneck [31, 23, 22].
To address this issue, several recent works have focused on reducing the communication cost
of distributed learning algorithms via gradient quantization and sparsification [33, 17, 34,
20, 21, 4, 35]. These algorithms have been shown to improve communication cost and hence
communication time in distributed learning. This is especially effective in the federated learning
setting where clients are mobile devices with expensive up-link communication cost [27, 20].
While communication is a key concern in client based distributed machine learning, an
equally important consideration is that of protecting the privacy of participating clients
and their sensitive information. Providing rigorous privacy guarantees for machine learning
applications has been an area of active recent interest [6, 36, 32]. Differentially private gradient
descent algorithms in particular were studied in the work of [2]. A direct application of these
mechanisms in distributed settings leads to algorithms with high communication costs. The
key focus of our paper is to analyze mechanisms that achieve rigorous privacy guarantees as
well as have communication efficiency.
1.2 Communication efficiency
We first describe synchronous distributed SGD formally. Let F (w) : Rd → R be of the form
F (w) =
1
M
·
M∑
i=1
fi(w),
where each fi resides at the ith client. For example, w’s are weights of a neural network and
fi(w) is the loss of the network on data located on client i. Let w0 be the initial value. At
round t, the server transmits wt to all the clients and asks a random set of n (batch size / lot
size) clients to transmit their local gradient estimates gti(w
t). Let S be the subset of clients.
The server updates as follows
gt(wt) =
1
n
∑
i∈S
gti(w
t), wt+1 , wt − γgt(wt)
for some suitable choice of γ. Other optimization algorithms such as momentum, Adagrad, or
Adam can also be used instead of the SGD step above.
Naively for the above protocol, each of the n clients needs to transmit d reals, typically
using O(d · log 1/η) bits1.
This communication cost can be prohibitive, e.g., for a medium size PennTreeBank language
model [38], the number of parameters d > 10 million and hence total cost is ∼ 38MB (assuming
32 bit float), which is too large to be sent from a mobile phone to the server at every round.
Motivated by the need for communication efficient protocols, various quantization algorithms
have been proposed to reduce the communication cost [34, 20, 21, 37, 24, 35, 5]. In these
protocols, the clients quantize the gradient by a function q and send an efficient representation
1η is the per-coordinate quantization accuracy. To represent a d dimensional vector X to an constant
accuracy in Euclidean distance, each coordinate is usually quantized to an accuracy of η = 1/
√
d.
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of q(gti(w
t)) instead of its actual local gradient gti(w
t). The server computes the gradient as
g˜t(wt) =
1
n
∑
i∈S
q(gti(w
t)),
and updates wt as before. Specifically, [34] proposes a quantization algorithm which reduces
the requirement of full (or floating point) arithmetic precision to a bit or few bits per value
on average. There are many subsequent works e.g., see [21] and in particular [5] showed that
stochastic quantization and Elias coding [15] can be used to obtain communication-optimal
SGD for convex functions. If the expected communication cost at every round t is bounded by
c, then the total communication cost of the modified gradient descent is at most
T · c. (1)
All the previous papers relate the error in gradient compression to SGD convergence. We first
state one such result for completeness for non-convex functions and prove it in Appendix A.
Similar (and stronger) results can be obtained for (strongly) convex functions using results
in [16] and [30].
Corollary 1 ([16]). Let F be L-smooth and ∀x ‖∇F (x)‖2 ≤ D. Let w0 satisfy F (w0)−F (w∗) ≤
DF . Let q be a quantization scheme, and γ , min
{
L−1,
√
2DF (σ
√
LT )−1
}
, then after T
rounds
Et∼(Unif[T ])[‖∇F (wt)‖22] ≤
2DFL
T
+
2
√
2σ
√
LDF√
T
+DB,
where σ2 = max
1≤t≤T
2E[‖gt(wt)−∇F (wt)‖22] + 2 max
1≤t≤T
Eq[‖gt(wt)− g˜t(wt)‖22], (2)
and B = max1≤t≤T ‖Eq[gt(wt)− g˜t(wt)]‖. The expectation in the above equations is over the
randomness in gradients and quantization.
The above result relates the convergence of distributed SGD for non-convex functions to
the worst-case mean square error (MSE) and bias in gradient mean estimates in Equation (2).
Thus smaller the mean square error in gradient estimation, better convergence. Hence, we
focus on the problem of distributed mean estimation (DME), where the goal is to estimate the
mean of a set of vectors.
1.3 Differential privacy
While the above schemes reduce the communication cost, it is unclear what (if any) privacy
guarantees they offer. We study privacy from the lens of differential privacy (DP). The notion
of differential privacy [13] provides a strong notion of individual privacy while permitting useful
data analysis in machine learning tasks. We refer the reader to [14] for a survey. Informally,
for the output to be differentially private, the estimated model should be indistinguishable
whether a particular client’s data was taken into consideration or not. We define this formally
in Section 2.
In the context of client based distributed learning, we are interested in the privacy of the
gradients aggregated from clients; differential privacy for the average gradients implies privacy
for the resulting model since DP is preserved by post-processing.
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The standard approach is to let the server add the noise to the averaged gradients (e.g.,
see [14, 2] and references within). However, the above only works under a restrictive assumption
that the clients can trust the server. Our goal is to also minimize the need for clients to trust
the central aggregator, and hence we propose the following model:
Clients add their share of the noise to their gradients gti before transmission. Aggregation
of gradients at the server results in an estimate with noise equal to the sum of the noise added
at each client.
This approach improves over server-controlled noise addition in several scenarios:
Clients do not trust the server: Even in the scenario when the server is not trustworthy,
the above scheme can be implemented via cryptographically secure aggregation schemes [7],
which ensures that the only information about the individual users the server learns is what
can be inferred from the sum. Hence, differential privacy of the aggregate now ensures that the
parameter server does not learn any individual user information. This will encourage clients to
participate in the protocol even if they do not fully trust the server. We note that while secure
aggregation schemes add to the communication cost (e.g., [7] adds log2(k · n) for k levels of
quantization), our proposed communication benefits still hold. For example, if n = 1024, a
4-bit quantization protocol would reduce communication cost by 67% compared to the 32 bit
representation.
Server is negligent, but not malicious: the server may "forget" to add noise, but is
not malicious and not interested in learning characteristics of individual users. However, if the
server releases the learned model to public, it needs to be differentially-private.
A natural way to extend the results of [14, 2] is to let individual users add Gaussian noise to
their gradients before transmission. Since the sum of Gaussians is Gaussian itself, differential
privacy results follow. However, the transmitted values now are real numbers and the benefits of
gradient compression are lost. Further, secure aggregation protocols [7] require discrete inputs.
To resolve these issues, we propose that the clients add noise drawn from an appropriately
parameterized Binomial distribution. We refer to this as the Binomial mechanism. Since
Binomial random variables are discrete, they can be transmitted efficiently. Furthermore, the
choice of the Binomial is convenient in the distributed setting because sum of Binomials is also
binomially distributed i.e., if
Z1, Z2 ∼ Bin(N1, p) then Z1 + Z2 ∼ Bin(N1 +N2, p).
Hence the total noise post aggregation can be analyzed easily, which is convenient for the
distributed setting2. Binomial mechanism can be of independent interest in other applications
with discrete output as well. Furthermore, unlike Gaussian it avoids floating point representation
issues.
1.4 Summary of our results
Binomial mechanism: We first study Binomial mechanism as a generic mechanism to release
discrete valued data. Previous analysis of the Binomial mechanism (where you add noise
Bin(N, p)) was due to [12], who analyzed the 1-dimensional case for p = 1/2 and showed that
to achieve (ε, δ) differential privacy, N needs to be ≥ 64 log(2/δ)/ε2. We improve the analysis
in the following ways:
2Another choice is the Poisson distribution. Different from Poisson, the Binomial distribution has bounded
support and has an easily analyzable communication complexity which is always bounded.
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• d-dimensions. We extend the analysis of 1-dimensional Binomial mechanism to d dimensions.
Unlike the Gaussian distribution, Binomial is not rotation invariant making the analysis
more involved. The key fact utilized in this analysis is that Binomial distribution is locally
rotation-invariant around the mean.
• Improvement. We improve the previous result and show that N ≥ 8 log(2/δ)/ε2 suffices
for small ε, implying that the Binomial and Gaussian mechanism perform identically as
ε→ 0. We note that while this is a constant improvement , it is crucial in making differential
privacy practical.
Differentially-private distributed mean estimation (DME): A direct application of
Gaussian mechanism requires n · d reals and hence n · d · log(nd) bits of communication. This
can be prohibitive in practice. However, a direct application of quantization [34] and Binomial
mechanism has high communication cost. We show that random rotation together with the
notion of high probability sensitivity can significantly improve communication.
In particular, for ε = O(1), we provide an algorithm achieving equal privacy and error as
that of the Gaussian mechanism with communication
≤ n · d ·
(
log2
(
1 +
d
n
)
+O(log log
(
nd
δ
))
bits,
per round of distributed SGD. Hence when d ≈ n, the number of bits is n · d · log(log(nd)/δ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the notion of differential
privacy and state our results for the Binomial mechanism. Motivated by the fact that the
convergence of SGD can be reduced to the error in gradient estimate computation per-round,
we formally describe the problem of DME in Section 4 and state our results in Section 5.
In Section 5.2, we provide and analyze the implementation of the binomial mechanism
in conjunction with quantization in the context of DME. The main idea is for each client to
add noise drawn from an appropriately parameterized Binomial distribution to each quantized
value before sending to the server. The server further subtracts the bias introduced by the
noise to achieve an unbiased mean estimator. We further show in Section 5.3 that the rotation
procedure proposed in [34] which reduces the MSE is helpful in reducing the additional error
due to differential privacy.
2 Differential privacy
2.1 Notation
We start by defining the notion of differential privacy. Formally, given a set of data sets D
provided with a notion of neighboring data sets ND ⊂ D×D and a query function f : D → X ,
a mechanismM : X → O to release the answer of the query, is defined to be (ε, δ) differentially
private if for any measurable subset S ⊆ O and two neighboring data sets (D1, D2) ∈ ND,
Pr (M(f(D1)) ∈ S) ≤ eε Pr (M(f(D2)) ∈ S) + δ. (3)
Unless otherwise stated, for the rest of the paper, we will assume the output spaces X ,O ⊆ Rd.
We consider the mean square error as a metric to measure the error of the mechanism M.
Formally,
E(M) , max
D∈D
E[‖M(f(D))− f(D)‖22].
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A key quantity in characterizing differential privacy for many mechanisms is the sensitivity of
a query f : D → Rd in a given norm `q. Formally this is defined as
∆q , max
(D1,D2)∈ND
‖f(D1)− f(D2)‖q. (4)
The canonical mechanism to achieve (ε, δ) differential privacy is the Gaussian mechanism
Mσg [14]:
Mσg (f(D)) , f(D) + Z,
where Z ∼ N (0, σ2Id). We now state the well-known privacy guarantee of the Gaussian
mechanism.
Lemma 1 ( [14]). For any δ, `2 sensitivity bound ∆2, and σ such that
σ ≥ ∆2
√
2 log
1.25
δ
,
Mσg is (∆2σ
√
2 log 1.25δ , δ) differentially private
3 and the error is bounded by d · σ2.
2.2 High probability sensitivity
In this section we introduce a notion of high probability sensitivity which allows us to work
randomized queries which do not have a worst case bound on sensitivity but have bounded
sensitivity with high probability. Let Q , {qi ∈ N} represent a set of natural numbers and
∆Q , {∆qi} represent a subset of real numbers. For two random vectors v1, v2, the event
‖v1 − v2‖Q ≤ ∆Q is defined as
(‖v1 − v2‖Q ≤ ∆Q) ,
⋃
i
(‖v1 − v2‖qi ≤ ∆qi)
Definition 1 ((∆Q, δ) sensitivity). Given a set of integers Q and values ∆Q, δ, we call a
randomized function f : D → X , (∆Q, δ) sensitive, if for any two neighboring data sets
D1, D2 ∈ ND, there exist coupled random variables X1, X2 ∈ X such that the marginal
distributions of X1, X2 are identical to that of f(D1) and f(D2) and
Pr
X1,X2
(‖X1 −X2‖Q ≤ ∆Q) ≥ 1− δ. (5)
We show the following result for high-probability sensitivity and the proof is provided in
Appendix C.
Lemma 2. Let M : X → O be an (ε, δ) differentially private mechanism for sensitivity ∆Q
and let f : D → X be a (∆Q, δ′) sensitive function. Then the composed mechanismM(f(D))
is (ε, δ + δ′) differentially private.
3All logs are to base e unless otherwise stated.
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3 Binomial Mechanism
We now define the Binomial mechanism for the case when the output space X of the query f is Zd.
The Binomial mechanism is parameterized by three quantities N, p, s where N ∈ N, p ∈ (0, 1),
and quantization scale s = 1/j for some j ∈ N and is given by
MN,p,sb (f(D)) , f(D) + (Z −Np) · s, (6)
where for each coordinate i, Zi ∼ Bin(N, p) and independent. One dimensional binomial
mechanism was introduced by [12] for the case when p = 1/2. We analyze the mechanism
for the general d-dimensional case and for any p. This analysis is involved as the Binomial
mechanism is not rotation invariant. By carefully exploiting the local rotation invariant
structure near the mean, we show that:
Theorem 1. For any δ, parameters N, p, s and sensitivity bounds ∆1,∆2,∆∞ such that
Np(1− p) ≥ max (23 log(10d/δ), 2∆∞/s) ,
the Binomial mechanism is (ε, δ) differentially private for
ε =
∆2
√
2 log 1.25δ
s
√
Np(1− p) +
∆2cp
√
log 10δ + ∆1bp
sNp(1− p)(1− δ/10) +
2
3∆∞ log
1.25
δ + ∆∞dp log
20d
δ log
10
δ
sNp(1− p) , (7)
where bp, cp, and dp are defined in (17), (12), and (16) respectively, and for p = 1/2,
bp = 1/3, cp = 5/2, and dp = 2/3. The error of the mechanism is
d · s2 ·Np(1− p).
The proof is given in Appendix B. We make some remarks regarding the design and the
guarantee for the Binomial Mechanism. Note that the privacy guarantee for the Binomial
mechanism depends on all three sensitivity parameters ∆2,∆∞,∆1 as opposed to the Gaussian
mechanism which only depends on ∆2. The ∆1 and ∆∞ terms can be seen as the added
complexity due to discretization.
Secondly setting s = 1 (i.e. providing no scale to the noise) in the expression (7), it
can be readily seen that the terms involving ∆1 and ∆2 scale differently with respect to the
variance of the noise. This motivates the use of the accompanying quantization scale s in the
mechanism. Indeed it is possible that the resolution of the integer that is provided by the
Binomial noise could potentially be too large for the problem leading to worse guarantees. In
this setting, the quantization parameter s helps normalize the noise correctly. Further, it can
be seen as long as the variance of the random variable s · Z is fixed, increasing Np(1− p) and
decreasing s makes the Binomial mechanism closer to the Gaussian mechanism. Formally, if
we let σ = s
√
Np(1− p) and s ≤ σ/(c√d), then using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, the ε
guarantee (7) can be rewritten as
ε = ∆2/σ
√
2 log 1.25/δ (1 +O (1/c)) .
The variance of the Binomial distribution is Np(1− p) and the leading term in ε matches
exactly the ε term in Gaussian mechanism. Furthermore, if s is o(1/
√
d), then this mechanism
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Figure 1: Comparison of error
vs privacy for Gaussian and Bi-
nomial mechanism at different
scales
(a) ε = 4.0 (b) ε = 2.0
Figure 2: cpSGD with rotation on the infinite MNIST
dataset. k is the number of quantization levels, and m is
the parameter of the binomial noise (p = 0.5, s = 1). The
baseline is without quantization and differential privacy.
δ = 10−9.
is very similar to the Gaussian mechanism. This result agrees with the Berry-Esseen type
Central limit theorems for the convergence of one dimensional Binomial distribution to the
Gaussian distribution.
In Figure 1, we plot the error vs ε for Gaussian and Binomial mechanism. Observe that as
scale is reduced, error vs privacy trade-off for Binomial mechanism approaches that of Gaussian
mechanism.
4 Distributed mean estimation (DME)
We have related the SGD convergence rate to the MSE in approximating the gradient at each
step in Corollary 1. Eq. (1) relates the communication cost of SGD to the communication cost
of estimating gradient means. Advanced composition theorem (Thm. 3.5 [19]) or moments
accounting [2] can be used to relate the privacy guarantee of SGD to that of gradient mean
estimate at each instance t. We also note that in SGD, we often sample the clients, standard
privacy amplification results via sampling [2], can be used to get tighter bounds in this case.
Therefore, akin to [34], in the rest of the paper we just focus on the MSE and privacy
guarantees of DME. The results for synchronous distributed GD follow from Corollary 1
(convergence), advanced composition theorem (privacy), and Eq. (1) (communication).
Formally, the problem of DME is defined as given n vectors X , {X1 . . . Xn} where Xi ∈ Rd
is on client i, we wish to compute the mean
X¯ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi
at a central server. For gradient descent at each round t, Xi is set to gti . DME is a
fundamental building block for many distributed learning algorithms including distributed
PCA/clustering [25].
While analyzing private DME we assume that each vector Xi has bounded `2 norm, i.e.
‖Xi‖ ≤ D. The reason to make such an assumption is to be able to define and analyze the
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privacy guarantees and is often enforced in practice by employing gradient clipping at each
client. We note that this assumption appears in previous works on gradient descent and
differentially private gradient descent (e.g. [2]). Since our results also hold for all gradients
without any statistical assumptions, we get desired convergence results and privacy results for
SGD.
4.1 Communication protocol
Our proposed communication algorithms are simultaneous and independent, i.e., the clients
independently send data to the server at the same time. We allow the use of both private
and public randomness. Private randomness refers to random values generated by each client
separately, and public randomness refers to a sequence of random values that are shared among
all parties4.
Given n vectors X , {X1 . . . Xn} where Xi ∈ Rd resides on a client i. In any independent
communication protocol, each client transmits a function of Xi (say q(Xi)), and a central
server estimates the mean by some function of q(X1), q(X2), . . . , q(Xn). Let pi be any such
protocol and let Ci(pi,Xi) be the expected number of transmitted bits by the i-th client during
protocol pi, where throughout the paper, expectation is over the randomness in protocol pi.
The total number of bits transmitted by all clients with the protocol pi is
C(pi,Xn1 ) def=
n∑
i=1
Ci(pi,Xi).
Let the estimated mean be ˆ¯X. For a protocol pi, the MSE of the estimate is
E(pi,Xn1 ) = E
[
‖ ˆ¯X − X¯‖22
]
.
We note that bounds on E((pi,Xn1 ), translates to bounds on gradients estimates in Eq. (2) and
result in convergence guarantees via Corollary 1.
4.2 Differential privacy
To state the privacy results for DME, we define the notion of data sets and neighbors as follows.
A dataset is a collection of vectors X = {X1, . . . Xn}. The notion of neighboring data sets
typically corresponds to those differing only on the information of one user, i.e. X,X⊗i are
neighbors if they differ in one vector.
Note that this notion of neighbors for DME in the context of distributed gradient descent
translates to two data sets
F = f1, f2, . . . fn and F ′ = f ′1, f
′
2, . . . f
′
n
being neighbors if they differ in one function fi and corresponds to guaranteeing privacy for
individual client’s data. The bound ‖Xi‖2 ≤ D translates to assuming ‖gti‖ ≤ D, ensured via
gradient clipping.
4Public randomness can be emulated by the server communicating a random seed
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5 Results for distributed mean estimation (DME)
In this section we describe our algorithms, the associated MSE, and the privacy guarantees in
the context of DME. First, we first establish a baseline by stating the results for implementing
the Gaussian mechanism by adding Gaussian noise on each client vector.
5.1 Gaussian protocol
In the Gaussian mechanism, each client sends vector
Yi = Xi + Zi,
where Zis are i.i.d distributed as N (0, σ2Id). The server estimates the mean by
ˆ¯X =
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
Yi.
We refer to this protocol as pig. Since
∑n
i=1 Zi/n is distributed as N (0, σ2Id/n) the above
mechanism is equivalent to applying the Gaussian mechanism on the output with variance
σ2/n. Since changing any of the Xi’s changes the norm of X¯ by at most 2D/n, the following
theorem follows directly from Lemma 1.
Theorem 2. Under the Gaussian mechanism, the mean estimate is unbiased and communica-
tion cost is n · d reals. Moreover, for any δ and σ ≥ 2D√
n
·√2 log 1.25/δ, it is (ε, δ) differentially
private for
ε =
2D√
nσ
√
2 log
1.25
δ
and E(pig, X) = dσ
2
n
,
We remark that real numbers can be quantized to O(log dn/εδ) bits with insignificant effect
to privacy5. However this is asymptotic and can be prohibitive in practice [20], where we have
a small fixed communication budget and d is of the order of millions. A natural way to reduce
communication cost is via quantization, where each client quantizes Yis before transmitting.
However how privacy guarantees degrade due to quantization of the Gaussian mechanism
is hard to analyze particularly under aggregation. Instead we propose to use the Binomial
mechanism which we describe next.
5.2 Stochastic k-level quantization + Binomial mechanism
We now define the mechanism pisk(Bin(m, p)) based on k-bit stochastic quantization pisk
proposed in [34] composed with the Binomial mechanism. It will be parameterized by 3
quantities k,m, p.
First, the server sends Xmax to all the clients, with the hope that for all i, j, −Xmax ≤
Xi(j) ≤ Xmax. The clients then clip each coordinate of their vectors to the range [−Xmax, Xmax].
For every integer r in the range [0, k), let B(r)represent a bin (one for each r), i.e.
B(r)
def
= −Xmax + 2rX
max
k − 1 , (8)
5Follows by observing that quantizing all values to 1/poly(n, d, 1/ε, log 1/δ) accuracy ensures minimum loss
in privacy. In practice this is often implemented using 32 bits of quantization via float representation.
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The algorithm quantizes each coordinate into one of the bins stochastically and adds scaled
Binomial noise. Formally client i computes the following quantities for every j
Ui(j) =
{
B(r + 1) w.p. Xi(j)−B(r)B(r+1)−B(r)
B(r) otherwise.
Yi(j) = Ui(j) +
2Xmax
k − 1 · Ti(j). (9)
where r is such that Xi(j) ∈ [B(r), B(r + 1)] and Ti(j) ∼ Bin(m, p). The client sends Yi to
the server. The server now estimates X¯ by
ˆ¯Xpisk(Bin(m,p)) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
Yi − 2X
maxmp
k − 1
)
. (10)
If ∀j, Xi(j) ∈ [−Xmax, Xmax], then
E
[
Yi − 2X
maxmp
k − 1
]
= Xi,
and ˆ¯Xpisk(Bin(m,p)) will be an unbiased estimate of the mean.
With no prior information on Xmax, the natural choice is to set Xmax = D. With this value
of Xmax we characterize the MSE, sensitivity, and communication complexity of the Binomial
mechanism below. To characterize the sensitivity of ˆ¯Xpisk(Bin(m,p)), we need few definitions.
For scalars D,Xmax, let
∆∞(Xmax, D)
def
= k + 1
∆1(X
max, D)
def
=
√
dD
q
+
√
2
√
dD log(2/δ)
q
+
4
3
log
2
δ
∆2(X
max, D)
def
=
D
q
+
√√√√
∆1 +
√
2
√
dD log(2/δ)
q
, (11)
where q = Xmax/(k − 1). We note that quantities k, δ, ε, d are omitted from the LHS of the
equations for the ease of notation. Combined with Theorem 1, this yields the privacy guarantees
for the binomial mechanism.
Theorem 3. If Xmax = D, then the mean estimate is unbiased and
E (pisk(Bin(m, p)), Xn) ≤ dD
2
n(k − 1)2 +
d
n
· 4mp(1− p)D
2
(k − 1)2 ,
Furthermore ifmnp(1−p) ≥ max (23 log(10d/δ), 2∆∞(D,Xmax)), then for any δ, ˆ¯Xpisk(Bin(m,p))
is (ε, 2δ) differentially private where ε is given by Theorem 1 with sensitivity parameters
{∆1(Xmax, D),∆2(Xmax, D),∆∞(Xmax, D)} (Eq. (11)). Furthermore,
C(pisk(Bin(m, p)), Xn) = n · (d log2(k +m) + O˜(1)).6
6O˜ is used to denote poly-logarithmic factors.
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We provide the proof in Appendix D. For ε ≤ 1, we bound the communication cost as
follows.
Corollary 2. There exists an implementation of pisk(Bin(m, p)), which achieves the same
privacy and error as the full precision Gaussian mechanism with a total communication
complexity of
n · d ·
(
log2
(√
d+
d
nε2
)
+O(log log
(
nd
εδ
)
)
)
bits.
Therefore our results provide precise non-asymptotic and asymptotic guarantees on the
total communication with respect to k. The communication cost of the above algorithm is
Ω(log d) bits per coordinate per client, which can be prohibitive. In the next section we show
that these bounds can be improved via rotation.
5.3 Error reduction via randomized rotation
As seen in Corollary 2, if pisk(Bin(m, p)) has error and privacy same as that of the Gaussian
mechanism, it has high communication cost. The proof reveals that this is due to the error
being proportional to O(d(Xmax)2/n). Therefore MSE reduces when Xmax is small, e.g., when
Xi is uniform on the unit sphere, Xmax is O
(√
(log d)/d
)
(whp) [10]. [34] showed that the
same effect can be observed by randomly rotating the vectors before quantization. Here we
show that random rotation reduces the leading term as well as improves the privacy guarantee.
Using public randomness, all clients and the central server generate a random orthogonal
matrix R ∈ Rd×d according to some known distribution. Given a protocol pi for DME which
takes inputs X1 . . . Xn, we define Rot(pi,R) as the protocol where each client i first computes,
X ′i = RXi,
and runs the protocol on X ′1, X ′2, . . . X ′n. The server then obtains the mean estimate
ˆ¯X ′ in the
rotated space using the protocol pi and then multiplies by R−1 to obtain the coordinates in the
original basis, i.e.,
ˆ¯X = R−1 ˆ¯X ′.
Due to the fact that d can be huge in practice, we need orthogonal matrices that permits
fast matrix-vector products. Naive matrices that support fast multiplication such as block-
diagonal matrices often result in high values of ‖X ′i‖2∞. Similar to [34], we propose to use a
special type of orthogonal matrix R = 1√
d
HA, where A is a random diagonal matrix with i.i.d.
Rademacher entries (±1 with probability 0.5) and H is a Walsh-Hadamard matrix [18]. The
Walsh-Hadamard matrix of dimension 2m for m ∈ N is given by the recursive formula,
H(21) =
[
1 1
1 −1
]
, H(2m) =
[
H(2m−1) H(2m−1)
H(2m−1) −H(2m−1)
]
.
Applying both rotation and its inverse takes O(d log d) time and O(1) space (with an in-place
algorithm).
The next theorem provides the MSE guarantees for Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p)), HA).
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Theorem 4 (Appendix E). For any δ, let Xmax = 2D
√
log(2nd/δ)
d , then
E(Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p))), HA) ≤
2 log 2ndδ ·D2
n(k − 1)2 +
8 log 2ndδ ·mp(1− p)D2
n(k − 1)2 + 4D
2δ2
and the bias is ≤ 2Dδ. Further if mnp(1 − p) ≥ max (23 log(10d/δ), 2∆∞(D,Xmax)) , then
ˆ¯X(Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p)))) is (ε, 3δ) differentially private where ε is given by Theorem 1 with
sensitivity parameters {∆1(Xmax, D),∆2(Xmax, D),∆∞(Xmax, D)} (Eq. (11)). Furthermore,
C(Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p))), Xn) = n · (d log2(k +m) + O˜(1)).
The following corollary bounds the communication cost for Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p)), HA) when
ε ≤ 1.
Corollary 3. There exists an implementation of Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p)), HA), that achieves the
same error and privacy of the full precision Gaussian mechanism with a total communication
complexity:
n · d
(
log2
(
1 +
d
nε2
)
+O
(
log log
dn
εδ
))
bits.
Hence if d = O(nε2), then Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p)), HA) has the same privacy and utilities as
the Gaussian mechanism, but with just O(nd log log(nd/δε)) communication cost.
6 Discussion
We trained a three-layer model (60 hidden nodes each with ReLU activation) on the infinite
MNIST dataset [8] with 25M data points and 25M clients. At each step 10,000 clients send
their data to the server. This setting is close to real-world settings of federated learning where
there are hundreds of millions of users. The results are in Figure 2. Note that the models
achieve different levels of accuracy depending on communication cost and privacy parameter ε.
We note that we trained the model with exactly one epoch, so each sample was used at most
once in training. In this setting, the per batch ε and the overall ε are the same.
There are several interesting future directions. On the theoretical side, it is not clear if our
analysis of Binomial mechanism is tight. Furthermore, it is interesting to have better privacy
accounting for Binomial mechanism via a moments accountant. On the practical side, we
plan to explore the effects of neural network topology, over-parametrization, and optimization
algorithms on the accuracy of the privately learned models.
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A Proof of biased SGD
The proof is similar to the SGD proof of [16], however we account for bias in gradient estimates.
Define the random variable δt , g˜t(wt)−∇F (wt−1). By the definitions of L and γ,
F (wt+1)− F (wt) ≤ ∇F (wt)T (wt+1 − wt) + L
2
‖wt+1 − wt‖2
≤ −∇F (wt)T (γg˜t(wt)) + γ2L
2
‖g˜t(wt)‖2
≤ −γ(1− γL
2
)‖∇F (wt)‖2 + γ(1− γL)‖∇F (wt)‖‖δt‖+ γ2L
2
‖δt‖2,
where the last inequality uses the fact that γL ≤ 1. Rearranging the above inequality and
summing over all t we get that
Et∈Uniform(T )[‖∇F (wt)‖2]
≤ 1
Tγ(2− γL)
(
2(F (w0)− F (w∗)) + Tγ2LE‖δt‖2
)
+
2γ(1− γL)
γ(2− γL)
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
‖∇F (wt)‖‖E[δt]‖
)
≤ 1
Tγ(2− γL)
(
2DF + Tγ
2Lσ2
)
+
2γ(1− γL)
γ(2− γL) DB
≤ 2DF
T
max
{
L,
σ
√
LT√
2DF
}
+
σ
√
2LDF√
T
+DB
≤ 2DFL
T
+
2
√
2LDFσ√
T
+DB.
B Binomial Mechanism - Proof of Theorem 1
To remind the reader, the binomial mechanism for releasing discrete valued queries on a database
is defined as follows. Given a set of databases D and an integer valued query f : D → Zd, the
binomial mechanism samples a vector Z ∈ Zd such that all its coordinates are distributed as
the binomial distribution with parameters N, p, i.e.
Z(j) ∼ Bin(N, p)
The Binomial mechanism releases the vector s(Z −Np) + f(D) as the output to the query.
For the analysis the reader is referred to the definition of `q norm sensitivity ∆q for any q > 0
defined in (4). The q of interest to us for the Binomial mechanism will be q = {1, 2,∞}. Since
our requirement from the Binomial mechanism will be symmetric w.r.t. p and 1−p, throughout
this proof, we assume that p ≤ 1/2.
To prove Theorem 1, we need few auxiliary lemmas. We first state two inequalities which
we use through-out the proof.
Lemma 3 (Bernstein’s inequality). Let X1, X2 . . . Xn be independent random variables such
that E[Xi] = 0 and |Xi| ≤M w.p. 1. Let σ2i , E[X2i ]. Then for any δ ≥ 0,
Pr
(∑
Xi ≥
√
2
∑
σ2i log
1
δ
+
2
3
·M log 1
δ
)
≤ δ.
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Lemma 4 (Efron-Stein inequality). Let f be a symmetric function of n independent random
variables X1, X2, . . . Xn. Let X ′1 be an i.i.d. copy of X1, then
Var(f) ≤ n
2
· E [(f(X1, X2, . . . Xn)− f(X ′1, X2, . . . Xn))2] .
We use the above two results in the next two lemmas.
Lemma 5. Let T ∼ Bin(N, p), i ∈ [0, N ], t ∈ Z, i− t ∈ [0, N ]. Then
Pr(T = i− t)
Pr(T = i)
≤ exp
(
t · log (i+ 1)(1− p)
(N − i+ 1)p
)
Proof.
Pr(T = i− t)
Pr(T = i)
,
(
N
i−t
)(
N
i
) pi−t(1− p)N−i+t
pi(1− p)N−i
=
i!(N − i)!
(i− t)!(N − i+ t)!
(
1− p
p
)t
≤
(
(i+ 1)(1− p)
(N − i+ 1)p
)t
,
where the inequality follows from considering the two cases when t can be positive or negative.
Lemma 6. Let t1, t2, . . . td be d real numbers. Let vi ∼ Bin(N, p) independently such that
Np(1 − p) ≥ 39. Let A be the event that ‖vi − Np‖∞ ≤ β for some β, such that β ≤
N min(p, 1− p)/3. Then for any δ, with probability ≥ 1− δ conditioned on A,
d∑
i=1
ti
(
· log (vi + 1)(1− p)
(N − vi + 1)p −
vi + 1
Np
+
N − vi + 1
N(1− p)
)
≤ 2‖t‖1(p
2 + (1− p)2)
3Np(1− p)(Pr(A)) +
‖t‖2cp
Np(1− p)√Pr(A) ·
√
log
1
δ
+
4‖t‖∞(β + 1)2(p2 + (1− p)2)
9N2p2(1− p)2 log
1
δ
,
where cp is given by
cp ,
√
2(3p3 + 3(1− p)3 + 2p2 + 2(1− p)2). (12)
Proof. Since β ≤ N min(p, 1− p)/3 and for any z ≥ −1/3, | log(1 + z)− z| ≤ 1.95z2/3,∣∣∣∣log (vi + 1)(1− p)(N − vi + 1)p − vi + 1Np + N − vi + 1N(1− p)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1.953
∣∣∣∣vi + 1−NpNp
∣∣∣∣2 + 1.953
∣∣∣∣N − vi + 1−N −NpN(1− p)
∣∣∣∣2 .
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Hence we can bound the expectation as
E
[
log
(vi + 1)(1− p)
(N − vi + 1)p −
vi + 1
Np
+
N − vi + 1
N(1− p)
∣∣∣∣A]
≤ E
[
1.95
3
∣∣∣∣vi + 1−NpNp
∣∣∣∣2 + 1.953
∣∣∣∣N − vi + 1−N −NpN(1− p)
∣∣∣∣2 ∣∣∣∣A
]
(a)
≤ 1
Pr(A)
· E
[
1.95
3
∣∣∣∣vi + 1−NpNp
∣∣∣∣2 + 1.953
∣∣∣∣N − vi + 1−N −NpN(1− p)
∣∣∣∣2
]
(b)
≤ 1
Pr(A)
· 2(p
2 + (1− p)2)
3Np(1− p) ,
Where (a) uses the fact that for any positive random variable X and any event A, E[X] ≥
Pr(A)E[X|A]. (b) uses the fact that Np(1− p) ≥ 39. Note that the function we are considering
is a sum of functions of d independent binomial random variables and hence we can apply
Bernstein’ inequality. To this end, we bound σ2i and M . Since ‖vi −Np‖∞ is bounded,∣∣∣∣log (vi + 1)(1− p)(N − vi + 1)p − vi + 1Np + N − vi + 1N(1− p)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 23
∣∣∣∣vi + 1−NpNp
∣∣∣∣2 + 23
∣∣∣∣N − vi + 1−N −NpN(1− p)
∣∣∣∣2
≤ 2
3
(β + 1)2(p2 + (1− p))2
N2p2(1− p)2 ,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that β ≤ N min(p, 1−p)/3 and for any z ≥ −1/3,
| log(1+z)−z| ≤ 2z2/3. Hence we can setM = 23 (β+1)
2(p2+(1−p))2
N2p2(1−p)2 . We now bound the variance:
Var
(
d∑
i=1
ti · log (vi + 1)(1− p)
(N − vi + 1)p −
vi + 1
Np
+
N − vi + 1
N(1− p)
∣∣∣∣A
)
.
We now bound σ2i . Observe that the term corresponding to i, is a function of n independent
Bernoulli p random variables Xi(j), for 1 ≤ j ≤ d. We bound the expected square change
in the function for any of these variables Xi(j) and then use Efron-Stein inequality. Let EA
denote the expectation conditioned on the event A. Without loss of generality we first consider
the contribution of the term Xi(j).
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Let w =
∑n
j′ 6=j Xi(j
′), then
EA
[
ti · log (vi + 1)(1− p)
(N − vi + 1)p −
vi + 1
Np
+
N − vi + 1
N(1− p) − ti · log
(v′i + 1)(1− p)
(N − v′i + 1)p
− v
′
i + 1
Np
+
N − v′i + 1
N(1− p)
]2
= t2iEA
[
· log (w +Xi(j) + 1)(1− p)
(N − w −Xi(j) + 1)p −
w +Xi(j) + 1
Np
+
N − w −Xi(j) + 1
N(1− p)
]
− t2iEA
[
· log (w +X
′
i(j) + 1)(1− p)
(N − w −X ′i(j) + 1)p
− w +X
′
i(j) + 1
Np
+
N − w −X ′i(j) + 1
N(1− p)
]2
(a)
= 2t2i p(1− p)EA
[
log
(
1 +
1
w + 1
)
+ log
(
1 +
1
N − w
)
− 1
Np
− 1
N(1− p)
]2
(b)
≤ 2t2i p(1− p)E
[
log
(
1 +
1
w + 1
)
+ log
(
1 +
1
N − w
)
− 1
Np
− 1
N(1− p)
]2
· 1
Pr(A)
= 2t2i p(1− p)E
[
log
(
1 +
1
w + 1
)
+ log
(
1 +
1
N − w
)
− 1
Np(1− p)
]2
· 1
Pr(A)
,
where (a) uses the fact that the term is non-zero only if Xi(j) = 1, X ′i(j) = 0 or Xi(j) =
0, X ′i(j) = 1 and the probability of this event is 2p(1−p). (b) uses the fact that for any positive
random variable X and any event A, E[X] ≥ Pr(A)E[X|A]. We first upper bound the term
inside the expectation:(
log
(
1 +
1
w + 1
)
+ log
(
1 +
1
N − w
)
− 1
Np(1− p)
)2
=
(
log
(
1 +
1
w + 1
)
+ log
(
1 +
1
N − w
))2
+
1
N2p2(1− p)2−
2
Np(1− p)
(
log
(
1 +
1
w + 1
)
+ log
(
1 +
1
N − w
))
≤ 1
(w + 1)2
+
1
(N − w)2 +
2
w(N − w) +
1
N2p2(1− p)2−
2
Np(1− p)
(
1
w + 1
− 1
2(w + 1)2
+
1
N − w −
1
2(N − w)2
)
=
1
(w + 1)(w + 2)
− 2
Np(1− p)
1
w + 1
+
1
(N − w)(N − w + 1) −
2
Np(1− p)
1
N − w
+
2
w(N − w)
+
1
(w + 1)2(w + 2)
+
1
(N − w)2(N − w + 1) +
1
Np(1− p)
(
1
(w + 1)2
+
1
(N − w)2
)
+
1
N2p2(1− p)2 ,
where the inequality uses the fact that for any positive x, x − x2/2 ≤ log x ≤ x. Observe
that w ∼ Bin(n − 1, p) and N − 1 − w ∼ Bin(n − 1, 1 − p). We use the following three
inequalities, to bound the expectation of the term above. Similar results apply for N − w as
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N − 1− w ∼ Bin(n− 1, 1− p). Since 1/w and 1/(N − w) are negatively correlated,
E
[
1
w(N − w)
]
≤ E
[
1
w
]
· E
[
1
N − w
]
.
Furthermore, for any i
E
[
w!
(w + i)!
]
≤ 1
(Np)i
and if Np(1− p) ≥ 2,
E
[
1
(w + 1)(w + 2)
− 2
Np(1− p)
1
w + 1
]
≤ 1
(Np)2
− 2
N2p2(1− p) .
Combining the above results and simplifying the terms, we get that the expectation of the
required quantity is bounded by
=
1
N3p3(1− p)3 · (3p
3 + 3(1− p)3 + 2p2 + 2(1− p)2).
Hence σ2i is bounded by
1
Pr(A)
· t
2
i
N2p2(1− p)2 · (3p
3 + 3(1− p)3 + 2p2 + 2(1− p)2),
and the lemma follows by Bernstein’s inequality.
Proof of Theorem 1. Firstly note that it is sufficient to consider the differential privacy of the
quantity f(D)s + Z where Z is a Binomial random variable. Note that since s is defined to be
1/j for some integer j the output f(D)/s remains integral. Further note that in this setting the
lq norm sensitivity scales ∆q/s. The above reduction shows that the scale s can be considered
to be 1 in the rest of the proof.
Consider any two neighboring data sets D1, D2 and let ∆ , f(D2) − f(D1). Note that
showing the (ε, δ) differential privacy of the Binomial mechanism is equivalent to showing the
following. Let T be a vector such that T (j) ∼ Bin(N, p) then for any vector v ∈ [N ]d we have
that
Pr(T = v) ≤ eεPr(T = v −∆) + δ
To show the above we will first define a set V such that
Pr(T ∈ V ) ≥ 1− δ,
and for every element v ∈ V ,
Pr(T = v) ≤ eε Pr(T = v −∆).
21
Define V as follows: v ∈ V if and only if,
‖v −Np‖∞ ≤ β ,
√
2Np(1− p) log(20d/δ) + 2
3
max(p, 1− p) log 20d
δ
. (13)
|∆ · (v −Np)| ≤ ‖∆‖2
√
2Np(1− p) log(1.25/δ) + 2
3
log(1.25/δ)‖∆‖∞. (14)
∀j, v(j)−∆(j) ∈ [0, N ] and v(j) ∈ Np±Np(1− p)/3.
d∑
i=1
∆(j) ·
(
log
(v(j) + 1)(1− p)
p(N − v(j) + 1) −
v(j) + 1
Np
+
N − v(j) + 1
N(1− p)
)
≤ 2‖∆‖1(p
2 + (1− p)2)
3Np(1− p)(1− δ/10)
+
‖∆‖2cp
Np(1− p)√1− δ/10 ·
√
log
10
δ
+
4‖∆‖∞(β + 1)2(p2 + (1− p)2)
9N2p2(1− p)2 log
10
δ
. (15)
We will first show that the probability of this event is large.
The first condition follows from Bernstein’s inequality with probability ≥ 1− δ/10. For the
second condition, observe that ∆ · (s−Np) is a function of Nd independent random variables.
A direct application of Bernstein’s inequality yields that Equation (14) holds with probability
≥ 1 − δ/1.25. The third condition follows from the first condition as ‖∆‖∞ ≤ Np − β and
Np(1− p)/3 ≥ β. Applying Lemma 6 with A being event that ‖v −Np‖∞ ≤ β and δ = δ/10,
yields that the fourth equation holds with probability at least 1− δ/10. Hence, by the union
bound,
Pr(T /∈ V ) ≤ δ.
We now prove the ratio of probabilities. For any v,
Pr(T = v −∆)
Pr(T = v)
=
d∏
i=1
Pr(T (j) = v(j)−∆(j))
Pr(T (j) = v(j))
≤ exp
(
d∑
i=1
∆(j) · log (v(j) + 1)(1− p)
p(N − v(j) + 1)
)
= exp
(
d∑
i=1
∆(j)(v(j)−Np)
Np(1− p) +
d∑
i=1
∆(j) ·
(
log
(v(j) + 1)(1− p)
p(N − v(j) + 1) −
v(j) + 1
Np
+
N − v(j) + 1
N(1− p)
)
+
∑d
j=1 ∆(j)(1− 2p)
Np(1− p))
)
where the inequality follows from Lemma 5. Since v ∈ V , applying Equations (13), (14), (15),
together with the fact that β ≤√2.5Np(1− p) log(20d/δ) (by the assumptions in the theorem)
yields the following bound on the exponent.
‖∆‖2 ·
√
2 log 1.25δ
Np(1− p) +
2‖∆‖∞
3Np(1− p) log
1.25
δ
+
‖∆‖2cp
√
log 10δ
Np(1− p)√1− δ/10 + ‖∆‖∞dp log
20d
δ log
10
δ
Np(1− p)
+
bp‖∆‖1
Np(1− p)(1− δ/10) ,
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where cp is defined in Equation (12) and
dp ,
4
3
· (p2 + (1− p)2) (16)
and
bp ,
2(p2 + (1− p)2)
3
+ (1− 2p). (17)
C High probability sensitivity Proof
Proof. To show (ε, δ + δ′) differential privacy we need to show that for any two neighboring
data sets D1, D2 and O ⊆ O,
Pr(M(f(D1)) ∈ O) ≤ eε Pr(M(f(D2)) ∈ O) + δ + δ′.
Given any two neighboring data sets D1, D2 let Pr∆Q,δ(X1, X2) represent the joint distribution
of the coupled random variables X1, X2 guaranteed by Definition 1. Now for any O ∈ O we
have that
Pr(M(f(D1)) ∈ O) ,
∫
s∈S
Pr(f(D1) = s) Pr(M(s) ∈ O)
(a)
=
(∫
s1,s2|‖s1−s2‖Q≤∆Q
Pr
∆Q,δ
(s1, s2)(Pr(M(s2) ∈ O)
)
+
(∫
s1,s2|‖s1−s2‖Q≥∆Q
Pr
∆Q,δ
(s1, s2)(Pr(M(s2) ∈ O)
)
(b)
=
(∫
s1,s2|‖s1−s2‖Q≤∆Q
Pr
∆Q,δ
(s1, s2)(Pr(M(s2) ∈ O)
)
+ δ
(c)
≤
(∫
s1,s2|‖s1−s2‖Q≤∆Q
Pr
∆Q,δ
(s1, s2)(e
ε Pr(M(s2) ∈ O) + δ)
)
+ δ′
(d)
≤ eε
(∫
s∈S
Pr(f(D2) = s) Pr(M(s) ∈ O)
)
+ δ + δ′
, eε Pr(M(f(D2)) ∈ O) + δ + δ′.
In the above (a), (d) follow from the fact that Pr∆q ,δ is a coupling, (b) follows from the condition
(5) guaranteed by the coupling and (c) follows from the (ε, δ) differential privacy guarantee of
the mechanismM.
D Application of Binomial Mechanism to Distributed Mean Es-
timation - Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3. We refer the readers to the definition of the protocol (Section 5.2) and in
particular the definitions of the random variables Ui, Ti, and the estimator ˆ¯Xpisk(Bin(m,p)) given
in equations (9) and (10) respectively.
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The communication complexity follows immediately by noting that the protocol only trans-
mits integers in the range [0, k +m) and therefore only needs log(k +m) bits. We now prove
the bound on the Mean Square Error of the protocol and then prove the sensitivity guarantee.
Mean Square Error
‖ ˆ¯X − X¯‖22 =
1
n2
d∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
E[( ˆ¯Xi(j)−Xi(j))2]
≤ 1
n2
d∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
E
[(
2Xmax
k − 1
)2
(Var(Ber(pi(j))) + Var(Bin(mp)))
]
≤ (2Xmax)2
(
d
4n(k − 1)2 +
d
n2
mnp(1− p)
(k − 1)2
)
,
where the equality follows from the fact that ˆ¯Xi(j) are independent of each other and ˆ¯X is
an unbiased estimator of ˆ¯X. Settingm, p, k as defined in the theorem proves the bound on MSE.
Differential Privacy
Given two neighboring data sets X , {X1 . . . Xn} and X⊗n , {X ′1 . . . X ′n} (where X ′i = Xi
for i ∈ [1, n − 1]) we will first provide a high probability bound on the `1, `2, `∞ sensitivity
of quantization protocol pisk. In particular the following lemma provides the high probability
sensitivity bounds.
Lemma 7. For every δ, given two neighboring data sets X , {X1 . . . Xn} and X⊗n ,
{X ′1 . . . X ′n} (where X ′i = Xi for i ∈ [1, n−1]) we have that the protocol pisk is ({∆1,∆2,∆∞}, δ)-
sensitive (c.f. Definition 1) where ∆1,∆2,∆∞ satisfy the following equations.
∆∞ ≤ ‖Xn −X
′
n‖∞
2Xmax/(k − 1) + 2 (18)
∆1 ≤ ‖Xn −X
′
n‖1
2Xmax/(k − 1) +
√
2
‖Xn −X ′n‖1 log(2/δ)
2Xmax/(k − 1) +
4
3
log(2/δ) (19)
∆2 ≤ ‖Xn −X
′
n‖2
2Xmax/(k − 1) +
√√√√ ‖Xn −X ′n‖1
2Xmax/(k − 1) +
√
8‖Xn −X ′n‖1 log(2/δ)
2Xmax/(k − 1) +
4
3
log(2/δ). (20)
Further we note that the protocol pisk(Bin(m, p)) is a composition of the binomial mechanism
and the protocol pisk. A direct application of Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 gives us that the
mechanism pisk(Bin(m, p)) is (ε, 2δ) differentially private for any δ ∈ (0, 1) and ε satisfying the
below conditions. 7 Note that the conditions required by Theorem 1 can be verified from the
given conditions in Theorem 3.
We now provide a proof of Lemma 7.
7we choose δ, δ′ as δ in the application of Lemma 2
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Proof of Lemma 7. To this end we recall the definition of the random variables Ui(j). Given
Xmax and Xmin we associate to every integer r in [0, k) a bin B(r) defined as
B(r) , −Xmax + 2rX
max
k − 1
Further given a number X ∈ [−Xmax, Xmax], let r(X) be the integer such that X ∈
[B(r(X)), B(r(X) + 1)]. We can now define the random variable
U(X) =
{
r(X) + 1 w.p. X−B(r(X))B(r(X)+1)−B(r(X))
r(X) otherwise.
Now define the random variables UXi (j) , U(Xi(j)) and similarly U
X⊗n
i (j) , U(X ′i(j)).
To provide high probability sensitivity bounds in accordance with Lemma 2, we need to define
a coupling between the random variables
∑
i U
X
i and
∑
i U
X⊗n
i . To do the above we will define
a coupling between the random variables UXi (j) and U
X⊗n
i (j). The coupled random variables
will be sampled as follows.
The defined coupling will have two cases. Define the set S = {(i, j)|r(Xi(j)) = r(X ′i(j))}.
We first consider the case when (i, j) ∈ S. In this case we sample a random variable αij ∈ [0, 1]
uniformly at random and define the random variables
Yi(j) =
{
r(Xi(j)) + 1 if αij ≤ Xi(j)−B(r(Xi(j)))B(r(Xi(j))+1)−B(r(Xi(j)))
r(Xi(j)) otherwise.
Y ⊗ni (j) =
{
r(X ′i(j)) + 1 if αij ≤ X
′
i(j)−B(r(X′i(j)))
B(r(X′i(j))+1)−B(r(X′i(j)))
r(X ′i(j)) otherwise,
Additionally wlog consider Xi > X ′i (the roles of i and i
′ can be reversed in the following
definitions otherwise) and define the auxiliary variables
ai(j) ,
B(r(Xi(j)) + 1)−Xi(j)
2Xmax/(k − 1) and bi(j) ,
X ′i(j)−B(r(X ′i(j)))
2Xmax/(k − 1)
Zi(j) =
{
0 w.p. ai(j) + bi(j)
1 otherwise,
Further define
Lij , |Yi(j)− Y ⊗ni (j)| = Zi(j) if (i, j) ∈ S (21)
Otherwise if (i, j) /∈ S or equivalently r(Xi(j)) 6= r(X ′i(j)), we sample the bins independently
and the random variables are defined as
Yi(j) =
{
r(Xi(j)) + 1 w.p.
Xi(j)−B(r(Xi(j)))
B(r(Xi(j))+1)−B(r(Xi(j)))
r(Xi(j)) otherwise.
Y ⊗ni (j) =
{
r(X ′i(j)) + 1 w.p.
X′i(j)−B(r(X′i(j)))
B(r(X′i(j))+1)−B(r(X′i(j)))
r(X ′i(j)) otherwise,
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Additionally wlog consider Xi > X ′i (the roles of i and i
′ can be reversed in the following
definitions otherwise) and define the auxiliary variables
ai(j) ,
Xi(j)−B(r(Xi(j)))
2Xmax/(k − 1) and bi(j) ,
B(r(X ′i(j)) + 1)−X ′i(j)
2Xmax/(k − 1)
Zi(j) =

0 w.p. 1− ai(j)− bi(j) + ai(j)bi(j)
1 w.p. ai(j) + bi(j)− 2ai(j)bi(j)
2 otherwise,
In this case define Li,j , r(Xi(j))− r(X ′i(j)) + 1 + Zi(j) and note that
|Yi(j)− Y ⊗ni (j)| ≤ Lij (22)
With these definitions, it can be seen that the marginal distributions of Yi(j), Y ⊗ni (j) are
equal to the marginal distributions of UXi (j), U
X⊗n
i (j) respectively. Further note that since
X ′i = Xi for all i ∈ [1, n− 1] we have that Yi = Y ⊗ni w.p. 1 for all i ∈ [1, n− 1]. Therefore
‖
∑
i
Yi −
∑
i
Y ⊗ni ‖qq = ‖Yn − Y ⊗nn ‖qq ≤
∑
j
Lqnj ,
where the inequality follows from (21) and (22). We wish to bound the RHS above. To that
end consider the following claim which follows from the definitions.
Claim 1.
Zi(j) ≤ 2 w.p. 1
E[Zi(j)] =
{
ai(j) + bi(j) if (i, j) /∈ S
1− (ai(j) + bi(j)) otherwise
E[Zi(j)− E[Zi(j)]2] ≤
{
ai(j) + bi(j) if (i, j) /∈ S
1− (ai(j) + bi(j)) otherwise
= E[Zi(j)]
E[Zi(j)− E[Zi(j)]4] ≤ 4E[Zi(j)− E[Zi(j)]2] ≤ 4E[Zi(j)].
Further note that∑
j
E[Zn(j)] =
∑
(n,j)/∈S
(ai(j) + bi(j)) +
∑
(n,j)∈S
1− (ai(j) + bi(j)) ≤ ‖Xn −X
′
n‖1
2Xmax/(k − 1) . (23)
A direct application of Bernstein’s Inequality gives us that with probability at least 1− δ/2∑
j
Zn(j) ≤ E[
∑
j
Zn(j)] +
√
2E[
∑
j
Zn(j)] log(2/δ) +
4
3
log(2/δ). (24)
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This gives us that∑
j
|Yn(j)− Y ⊗n (j)|
a≤
∑
j
Lnj
b≤
∑
(i,j)∈S
Zi(j) +
∑
(i,j)/∈S
(
r(Xi(j))− r(X ′i(j)) + 1 + Zi(j)
)
c≤ ‖Xn −X
′
n‖1
2Xmax/(k − 1) +
√
2
‖Xn −X ′n‖1
2Xmax/(k − 1) log(2/δ) +
4
3
log(2/δ)
where a, b follow from (21) and (22) and c follows from Claim 1 and (23). This proves the
`1 norm bound.
We now focus on the `2 norm case. For this we note that
∀(i, j) Lij =
{
Xi(j)−X′i(j)
2Xmax/(k−1) + Zi(j)− E[Zi(j)] if Xi(j) ≥ X ′i(j)
X′i(j)−Xi(j)
2Xmax/(k−1) + Zi(j)− E[Zi(j)] if Xi(j) < X ′i(j).
Therefore√∑
j
L2nj =
√√√√∑
j
(
Xi(j)−X ′i(j)
2Xmax/(k − 1)
)2
+
√∑
j
(Zn(j)− EZn(j))2. (25)
We now bound
√∑
j(Zn(j)− EZn(j))2. We can now apply Bernstein’s inequality on the
random variable (Zn(j)− EZn(j))2 to get that with probability at least 1− δ/2∑
j
(Zn(j)− EZn(j))2 ≤
∑
j
E[Znj ] +
√
8
∑
j
E[Znj ] log(2/δ) +
4
3
log(2/δ), (26)
where the RHS uses Claim 1 for bounding expectation and variance.
Therefore combining (25) and (26), we get that
‖Yn − Y ′n‖2 ≤
√∑
j
L2nj
≤ ‖Xn −X
′
n‖2
2Xmax/(k − 1) +
√√√√ ‖Xn −X ′n‖1
2Xmax/(k − 1) +
√
8
( ‖Xn −X ′n‖1
2Xmax/(k − 1)
)
log(2/δ) +
4
3
log(2/δ).
The proof is finished using a union bound.
E Quantization with Rotation
We prove Theorem 4 here.
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Differential Privacy
Given any two neighboring data sets X = {X1, . . . Xn}, X⊗n = {X1, . . . X ′n} we define a set of
good rotations Ugood as follows
Ugood =
R ∈ U |∀ i ∈ [n] ‖RXi‖∞ ≤ 2
√
log(2ndδ )D2√
d
, ‖RX ′n‖∞ ≤
2
√
log(2ndδ )D2√
d

where U is the set of d× d orthonormal matrices. The following lemma follows from [3]. We
note that similar analysis holds for uniformly sampled R over real domain and we refer the
reader to [10] for details.
Lemma 8 ([3]).
P (HA ∈ Ugood) ≥ 1− δ
Let Rot(pi,HA)(X),Rot(pi,HA)(X⊗n) represent the random output of the protocol Rot(pi,HA)
on X,X⊗n respectively and let S be any subset of the output range of Rot(pi,HA). Given δ let ε
be given by Theorem 1 with sensitivity parameters {∆1(Xmax, D),∆2(Xmax, D),∆∞(Xmax, D)}.
Given a set of vectors V and a rotation matrix R define R · V = {Rv|v ∈ V }.
Pr(Rot(pi,HA)(X) ∈ S)
≤
∫
R∈Ugood
(Pr(Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p)), HA)(X) ∈ S|R)) dR+ Pr(R /∈ Ugood)
=
∫
R∈Ugood
Pr(Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p)), HA)(R ·X) ∈ R · S)dR+ Pr(R /∈ Ugood)
a≤
∫
R∈Ugood
(eεPr(pisk(Bin(m, p))(R ·X⊗n) ∈ R · S) + 2δ) dR+ Pr(R /∈ Ugood)
=
∫
R∈Ugood
eε (Pr(Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p)), HA)(X⊗n) ∈ S|R) + 2δ) dR+ Pr(R /∈ Ugood)
≤ eεPr(Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p)), HA)(X⊗n) ∈ S) + 3δ
a follows from (ε, 2δ) differential privacy guarantee for pisk(Bin(m, p)) from Theorem 3 and
noting that R ∈ Ugood in the integral. Hence Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p))) offers (ε, 3δ) differential-
privacy.
Mean Square Error
The bound on the MSE can be observed by noting that the total change the entire protocol
can cause on any individual client vector is bounded by 2D in `2 norm, therefore the total
MSE can be at most 4D2 irrespective of the choice of rotation. Therefore
E(Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p))), HA) = E(Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p))), HA|R ∈ Ugood)+
E(Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p))), HA|R /∈ Ugood)
a≤ E(Rot(pisk(Bin(m, p))), HA|R ∈ Ugood) + 4D2δ2
b≤ 2 log
2nd
δ ·D2
n(k − 1)2 +
8 log 2ndδ
n
· mp(1− p)D
2
(k − 1)2 + 4D
2δ2
a follows from the argument above and b follows from the MSE guarantee in Theorem 3 and
by noting that the rotation is in Ugood.
28
